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STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Statement of Facts in the Boulder Town Brief merely cite to the formal
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered by the trial court, rather than to the
transcript or actual evidence presented to support such Findings. The majority of facts in the
Brief submitted by Boulder Excavating Company ("BEC") have no citations at all, or also
fail to cite to any actual evidence presented to support the trial court's Findings.
In reply, the Petitioners wish to clarify the following facts:
1.

The Petition does assert that the passage of the Ordinance was illegal

and not in compliance with state law, because no official map was adopted with the
Ordinance, § 10-9-402, U.C.A.; and that there is no official map available setting forth the
nine districts designated in the Ordinance. (Petition % 26(1), Record 10). The Town admits
that there is no such map available and "no timetable for producing it." (See Town Meeting
minutes, June 17, 1999; Addendum F). Although Part IV B of the Land Use Ordinance
refers to an "official base map" there was no "official base map" adopted with the Ordinance.
(Record 388, 55-57) There is no evidence that an official base map was adopted with the
Ordinance. It is admitted that no official map was introduced into evidence. (Town's Brief
p. 5,1f 4) The Town merely claims, through the argument of counsel, that such a map exists.
(Record 388,19-20). The Town's cite to the Record 318-19 in support of this fact, is merely
to the formal Findings entered by the court; and not to any actual evidence presented in
court. BEC also makes this claim, but makes no citation to the record. (BEC Brief p. 5, ^
4).
1

2.

The parties never agreed to the location of the properties under the

specific districts as designated in the zoning Ordinance. The parties could not have agreed
to this because, as admitted, an official map was never presented or introduced into evidence.
(Town's Brief p. 5,1f4).
3.

The only map introduced into evidence was the existing use map,

prepared by the Five County Associations of Governments in January 1999, more than six
months after the Ordinance was adopted in May 1998. Moreover, this same map was
attached to the Petition, and the Town denied it was an official map. (Answer Tfs 14 & 15,
Record 66-67). Further, this existing use map shows six different uses (Addendum A), while
the Ordinance designates nine separate zoning districts. (Ord. p. 45, Table I, Record 58).
4.

The allegations of Hatch in the Petition and in his Notice of Appeal

regarding the location of the properties within certain districts, i.e., Greenbelt/Multiple Use
and Medium Density Residential, is not based upon any "official zoning map," but rather
upon the existing use map, attached to the Petition. (See Petition, ]fs 19 & 20, Record 8).
The same map, the Town denied was an official map. (Answer ^fs 14 & 15, Record 66-67).
5.

Hatch could not have testified concerning the location of these

properties under the nine separate zoning districts in the Ordinance, because he had never
seen an official zoning map for the Ordinance. (Record 388, p. 74; Question: "[Mr. Hatch]
have you, to this day, ever seen an official zoning map corresponding to the zoning
ordinance? Answer: No). Therefore, the trial court could not find, based solely upon

2

Hatch's testimony, that the properties were located in any of the specific districts, as
designated under the Ordinance.
6.

The trial court in its Findings indicates that the Thompson Ranch

Property is designated by the Land Use Ordinance as "District V and "green belt/multiple
use lands;" and the Stout Property is designated by the Land Use Ordinance as "District 6"
and "medium density residential." (Record 320) The Land Use Ordinance does not make any
such designation; and there was no official map introduced for the trial court to make such
findings. To support this claim, the Town merely cites to the trial court's formal Findings,
and no evidence to support the Findings. The only evidence cited by BEC is the Town
Council minutes of June 17,1999, more than a year after the Ordinance was adopted, where
is it recorded that Mr. Hatch was still asking for a copy of the map, but was told that Five
Counties is preparing it, "but it is not ready, and there is not a timetable for producing it."
This evidence is not enough to support the trial court's Findings.
7.

The Petitioners submitted substantial evidence through testimony and

letters, which were admitted into evidence, regarding their concerns and objections to the
granting of the conditional use permits. These are the same objections contained in the
Petition, and are set forth in Appellants' Opening Brief. [See Brief of Appellant's \ 14 (1)(10)]. There was evidence presented regarding Petitioners' objections and concerns, yet the
trial court in its Findings simply states in one sentence that, "Petitioners appeared at the
public hearing and presented and read written objections to issuance of the permits."

3

(Findings Tf 7, Record 319). There is no finding made as to what the objections and concerns
were, or how they were dealt with by the Town in a reasonable and good faith manner.
8.

There was also no evidence presented to the trial court to support the

Town's approval of the conditional use permits. The trial court again simply states in one
sentence that, "the Town Council affirmed issuance of the Conditional Use Permits to
Boulder Excavating." (Findings f 15, Record 321) There is no finding of the issues raised
by the Petitioners. No finding that these issues were considered and dealt with by the Town.
No evidence or finding to support the conditional use permits, despite the objections and
concerns raised by the Petitioners. The Town still fails to point to any substantial evidence
to support the conditional use permits, but merely cites to the trial court's formal Findings.
BEC can only cite to two sentences in the Town minutes of June 17, 1999, as follows, "The
appeals made by Lynne and Julian to the conditional-use permits issued to Boulder
Excavating Company were discussed. There was a lengthy discussion at the last meeting,
but they were not in attendance." This statement in the Town minutes does not show
substantial evidence to support the conditional use permits; but rather shows that the Town
did not act in good faith and did not provided a fair hearing on the issues.
9.

The Ordinance has specific Site Development Plan Requirements that

must be met before conditional uses are approved. § 10-2-407 U.C.A. These are set forth in
PART III Conditional Uses, paragraph F, Site Development Plan Requirements. (Ord. p. 7-8,
Record 20-21). These Site Plan Requirements were raised by the Petitioners and were
presented as evidence to the trial court, both in testimony (Record 388 pp. 54-55) and in
4

letters. (Addendum, Exhibits D & F). Compliance with these Site Plan Requirements,
however, was never addressed by the Town, at the hearing, or by the court in its Findings.
10.

The Ordinance also limits the conditional uses allowable under each

separate district. These allowable uses are specifically listed. For example, the conditional
uses for the Greenbelt/Multiple Use District are listed as: (1) Churches; (2) Publicly funded
schools (nursery, primary and secondary schools); (3) Parks and public buildings; (4) Public
utilities; (5) Living quarters for hired hands, seasonal laborers, or others receiving
compensation for work performed on site; (6) Bed and breakfast establishments; (7) Riding
academies, schools and accompanying stables; (8) Dude/guest ranch; (9) Commercial. (Ord.
pp. 21-22, Record 34-35). The conditional uses allowed for Medium Density Residential
are also specifically listed. (Ord. p. 24, Record 37). These commercial uses are specifically
listed as conditional uses under each districts, although they are also listed as commercial,
under Commercial District No. 9. (Ord. p. 27, Record 40).
11.

The Petition asserts that granting the conditional use permits for a

commercial contract construction business was improper, since under the Ordinance
"contract construction9' is only allowed under Commercial District No. 9, and is not listed
as one of the conditional uses allowed in the other districts. (Petition ^f 26(2), Record at 10).
12.

The Petition further asserts that the term "commercial" listed as a

conditional use under the other districts, without any meaning, definition, or parameters is
too vague and ambiguous, making the Ordinance illegal, or at a minimum, resulting in the
arbitrary, capricious and illegal enforcement of the Ordinance. (Petition 1f 17, Record 7-8).
5

The Planning Commission earlier realized this problem and recommended that the term
"commercial" be deletedfromthe conditional use provisions of these other districts. (Record
388, pp. 64, 95, 120-122; Trial Ex. "12", Addendum G).
13.

The Petition further asserts that the Commercial Design Criteria of

Commercial District No. 9, was never complied with in granting the "contract construction"
business, which itself, is listed in Commercial District No. 9. (Petition 1fs 12 & 24, Record
5 &10). The Commercial Design Criteria was also never addressed by the Town at the
hearing, or by the court in its Findings.
14.

The conditional use permits were approved, without substantial

evidence; and in direct violation of the terms and conditions of the zoning Ordinance.
(Petition ^f 24, Record 10). There is no evidence on the record or any finding by the trial
court, regarding the Town's compliance with these terms and conditions, which are set forth
in the Ordinance.
15.

The trial court in one sentence, found that, "the uses for which the

Conditional Use Permits were granted are compatible with other uses authorized and existing
in the same districts." (Record 322). There is no evidence to support this finding. The Town
again, merely cites to the formal Findings of Fact and no supporting evidence. BEC refers
to the transcript, (pp. 64-65, 140) claiming that Appellants operate a business from their
property; however, pages 64-65 of the transcript doesn't say anything about the Appellants
operating a business on their property, and the testimony on pages 140-141 of the transcript,
merely indicates that Hatch has a business office and Mitchell sells some stone carvings.
6

There is also mention of some farm equipment in the area, but nothing close to the operation
of a construction business; and nothing to support the trial courts finding that there are
compatible businesses in the same district.1
16.

The Petition seeks judicial review of the Town's actions in adopting the

Ordinance and in granting the conditional use permits; and further seeks injunctive relief to
enjoin any further building or construction on the properties, pending a final determination
of the proceeding. (Petition p. 11, Record 11).
17.

The Petitioners not only sought to enjoin further construction of any

buildings on the properties, but also the continued operation of a contract construction
business next to their property. (Record 72-82)

The Petitioners put on evidence of

irreparable harm and how their property was being forever changed, as a result of the
continuing operation ofa construction business next door. (Record 388, pp. 67-68; 137-140).
In regards to the operation of the business, the trial court, during the hearing, found that the
Petitioners' had a legitimate complaint. "I can sure see where things like that would start
to get under your skin. And if that's what's goin' on here, you can see where Ms. Mitchell
has something to complain about. If the diesel engine runs and runs and runs and runs and
the fumes are noxious and she doesn't like 'em, then that could be a problem." (Trans, p.
173-174, Record 388).

*The court does not even know the boundary of this district, because there is no
map.
7

18.

The trial court then later found that Petitioners claims were without

merit; and that they acted in bad faith without an honest belief in their claims, but solely with
the intent to hinder, delay and/or take unconscionable advantage of BEC and the Town of
Boulder. (Record 362). The court made thisfindingwithout ruling on the issues raised by
the Petitioners; and by failing to state exactly how the Petition was in any way a hinderence
to BEC or the Town; or how the Petition allowed the Petitioners to take any unconscionable
advantage over BEC or the Town.
19.

A Notice of Hearing was sent out for the Preliminary Injunction hearing;

and no objection, or request for continuance was made by either Respondent. In fact, before
the hearing commenced, counsel for both parties indicated that they were ready to proceed.
(Record 388, pp. 6-7).
20.

The Memorandum in Opposition filed by BEC, was not filed until the

day before the hearing on August 30, 1999. (Record 174). The Town's Memorandum in
Opposition to the Motion was notfileduntil the morning of the hearing. (Record 388, p. 7).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The zoning Ordinance as adopted, is arbitrary, capricious and illegal, because
there is no official map, and if there was, there was no official map adopted with the
Ordinance. Call v. City of West Jordan. 727 P.2d 180 (Utah 1986). There is no presumption
of validity in this regard. Springville Citizens v. City of Springville. 972 P.2d 332 (Utah
1999). The term "commercial" used in the Ordinance, without any meaning, definition or
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parameters makes the Ordinance too vague, and subject to arbitrary and capricious
enforcement. Thurston v. Cache County. 626 P.2d 440 (Utah 1981).
The conditional use permits were granted without any substantial evidence and
in disregard of the evidence against the issuance of the permits presented by the Petitioners,
making the decision arbitrary and capricious. Ralph L. Wadsworth Constr. Inc. v. West
Jordan City. 999 P.2d 1240 (Ut.App. 2000). The Town also failed to comply with the terms
and conditions set forth in the Town's own Ordinance, i.e., the Site Development Plans
required for conditional uses, and the Commercial Design Criteria required under
Commercial District No. 9 for contract construction in issuing the permits, making the action
illegal. Springville Citizens, supra.
The granting of the conditional use permits is an administrative/adjudicative
act, which requires the support of substantial evidencefromthe record. There is no evidence
in the record to support the granting of the conditional use permits in this case. This is
admitted by the Town and by BEC. (Town's Brief pp. 13-14; BEC Brief p. 24). The Town
and BEC do not rely on any evidence in the record to support the permits, but instead they
rely solely on the presumption of validity. (Town's Brief pp 13-14; BEC Brief p. 16)
However, the presumption of validity is not so absolute. The arbitrary,
capricious and illegal standard in reviewing land use decisions is not a one-size-fits-all
standard. Harmon Citv v. Draper Citv. 388 U.A.R 24, 26 (Ut.App. 2000). There is an
important distinction between administrative and legislative functions for the purpose of

9

judicial review. Id. at 26. The trial court, in this case, did not make this distinction and did
not apply the proper standard of review for each function.
Granting conditional use permits is an administrative function. Ralph L.
Wadsworth Const., Inc. v. West Jordan City. 999 P.2d 1240 (Ut.App. 2000). Therefore, the
city's land use decision, when performing this function, is arbitrary and capricious if it is not
supported by substantial evidence. Id.; Springville Citizens v. City of Springville, 972 P.2d
332 (Utah 1999). In evaluating the city's decision under this standard, the evidence in the
record is reviewed to ensure that the city proceeded within the limits of fairness and in good
faith. The reviewing court is also to determine whether, in light of the evidence before the
city, a reasonable mind could reach the same conclusion. Id.
The trial court in this case did not make such a determination, but simply relied
on a presumption of validity, in refusing to review the evidence. The court stated that, "it
was a political decision, not one to be reviewed by me." (Trans, p 204, Record 388).
Since the Town is acting in an administrative/adjudicative capacity, its action
has to be supported by substantial evidence on the record. The burden to show such
evidence thus rests with the municipality. Ralph L. Wadsworth Constr. v. West Valley City,
999 P.2d 1240 (Ut.App. 2000). The Town's citation to Harmon City v. Draper City. 997
P.2d 321, (Ut.App. 2000) to argue that it is somehow the Petitioners' burden to show
substantial evidence to issue the permits is in error. In Harmon City v. Draper City, supra,
this Court was applying the higher "reasonably debatable" standard for legislative functions,
not the substantial evidence standard for administrative/adjudicative functions. In fact, in
10

Ralph L. Wadsworthu where the substantial evidence standard was applied, the burden to
show substantial evidence to support the land use decision was properly placed on the city.
This Court found against the city, because there was no substantial evidence on the record
to support the city's decision on the conditional use permit, stating "the record does not
reveal whether the Commission's staff actually investigated the concerns raised at the public
hearing." Id. In this case, legitimate concerns were likewise raised, with no substantial
evidence in the record to support the Town's decision in regards to these concerns or the
issuance of the permits. Moreover, even if this burden was the Petitioners initially, they have
claimed all along, that there is no substantial evidence to support the conditional use permits,
thereby placing the burden to show otherwise on the Town. To hold otherwise, the
Petitioners are, in effect, being penalized for establishing their claim, i.e., that there is no
substantial evidence to support the issuance of the permits.
Finally, regardless of the presumptions, the trial court never determined
whether or not the Town violated its own Ordinance in granting the conditional use permits.
If the Town violated its own Ordinance in granting the conditional use permits, then its
action is illegal, regardless of any presumption of validity, or whether or not, there may be
substantial evidence. Call v. City of West Jordan, 727 P.2d 180 (Utah 1986); Springville
Citizens v. City of Springville. 972 P.2d 332 (Utah 1999).

11

I.

THE ZONING ORDINANCE IS ILLEGAL BECAUSE
THE TOWN FAILED TO COMPLY WITH UTAH'S
ENABLING STATUTES IN ADOPTING THE ORDINANCE.

A.

There was no Official Map adopted with the Zoning Ordinance. When

enacting zoning ordinances, statutory procedures must be strictly complied with, or the
action is illegal and void. Call v. City of West Jordan. 727 P.2d 180 (Utah 1986).
Moreover, since the presentation of the map is a statutory requirement, it should be strictly
complied with, and there should be no presumption of validity in this regard. Springville
Citizens v. City of Springville. 972 P.2d 332 (Utah 1999).
Utah statute requires both the full text of the ordinance, as well as, maps for
all parts of the area within the municipality. §10-9-402 U.C.A. (1953, as amended). Thus,
the proposed "zoning ordinance recommendation," referred to in § 10-9-402 is to include the
"full text of the zoning ordinance and maps." §10-9-402(1) U.C.A. (emphasis added).
In this case, there is no evidence that an official map was recommended with
the zoning Ordinance. No map was presented into evidence covering all of the parts of the
proposed zoning districts, or containing all of the districts designated under the zoning
Ordinance. (Record 388, p.55-57,144,150-151). The only map presented was the existing
use map, which the Town denied was an official map. Since there was no official map
recommended with the Ordinance at a public hearing, as required under Utah statute; the
passage of the zoning Ordinance was an illegal act and the Ordinance is illegal. Call v. City
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of West Jordan. 727 P.2d 180 (Utah 1986); Stockwell v. Citv of Ritzville. 663 P.2d 151
(Wash.App. 1983).
The evidence, even when marshaled in favor of the Town on this issue, is that
no official map was introduced into evidence. [The Town admits that there was no official
map introduced. (Town's Brief p. 5, f 4)] The Town merely claims, through the argument
of counsel, that such a map exists . (Record 388, 19-20). However, there is no evidence in
the record to support this. The Town's cite to the Record (318-19) in support of this claim,
is merely to the formal Findings of Fact entered by the trial court; and not to any evidence
actually presented to support this Finding.
Furthermore, the trial court's finding that, "such a map exists," (Record 319)
does not sufficiently satisfy the statute, which requires that the "recommendation", including
both the full text of the ordinance, as well as, maps for all parts of the area within the
municipality, be presented at a public hearing. Not that it merely exists. § 10-9-402 U.C.A.
(1953, as amended). The trial court did not make any finding that this happened; and the
evidence presented shows that this never occurred.
The testimony of Mitchell, cited by the Town (Trans. 142-144, Record 388)
is that the only map presented was the existing use map and that the official map was not
done yet. (Trans. 144, Record 388). The minutes of June 17, 1999, more than a year after
the Ordinance was adopted, shows that Hatch was still asking for a copy of the official map,
but was told, "it is not ready and there is not a timetable for producing it." This evidence
even when marshaled in the Town's favor is not enough to support the trial court's Findings.
13

Moreover, if there wasn't any map and the Ordinance is declared illegal and
void, then the Petitioners have prevailed on that part of their Petition; and although other
parts of the Petition, may be viewed in a sense moot, to the extent there is no more
Ordinance to review the conditional use permits; the Petitioners are still prevailing parties
on part of their Petition, and they no longer have to worry about the illegal, arbitrary and
capricious enforcement of an illegal zoning ordinance in their Town.
In addition, because there was no map, Hatch could not have testified
concerning the location of the properties under the zoning Ordinance. Hatch had never seen
an official zoning map for the Ordinance. (Record 388, p. 74). Based upon Hatch's
testimony alone, without an official zoning map, the trial court could not find that the
relevant properties were located in any specific districts of the zoning Ordinance.
Finally, as far as prejudice to the Petitioners, the evidence shows that they have
continually requested a copy of the official map, and one has never been presented to them.
They have been prejudiced by this. They have been unable to find out how their land is
currently zoned. This prevents them from enjoying their property to its fullest potential.
Furthermore, the conditional use permits were granted to allow a construction business next
to their property without substantial evidence, and without any compliance to the terms and
conditions set forth in the Ordinance, which were put in place to protect the landowners in
the area from exactly this type of abuse.

14

H.

THE ZONING ORDINANCE IS TOO VAGUE, THUS
SUBJECT TO ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS
ENFORCEMENT.

A.

Without an Official Zoning Map the Ordinance is too vague: thus, subject

to arbitrary and capricious enforcement. Without an official zoning map, the designation
of the zoning districts is improperly left solely to the interpretation of administrative
officials. Thurston v. Cache County, 626 P.2d 440 (Utah 1981); Indian Trial Property
Owners Ass'n v. Citv of Spokane. 886 P.2d 209 (Wash.App. 1994).
The zoning Ordinance in this case contains nine (9) separate districts, each
defined with its own purpose and conditions,fromHigh Density Residential to Commercial.
Without a zoning map to correspond to these districts, the Ordinance lacks a sufficient
definition of terms, and does not afford due process, as citizens do not know how their
property is zoned and what specific conditions may apply to their property. This gives the
Town unreviewable discretion and power to enforce the conditions of whatever district they
chose on any particular land owner. Without a corresponding map the zoning Ordinance is
void for vagueness. Thurston v. Cache County. 626 P.2d 440 (Utah 1981); Sherman v. City
of Colo. Springs Planning Comm'n. 763 P.2d 292 (Colo. 1988)
B.

Use of the term "commercial" as a conditional use, without definition,

makes the Ordinance vague and subject to arbitrary and capricious enforcement. The
Ordinance is also vague due to the use of the term "commercial" as a conditional use,
without further definition or clarification. Burien Bark Supply v. King County. 725 P.2d 994
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(Wash. 1986); Atlanta Attractions. Inc. v. MasselL 330 F.Supp. 865 (N.D.Ga. 1971) Affd
463 F.2d 449 (5th Or. 1972); State v. Jones, 865 P.2d 138 (Ariz.App. 1993); Anderson v.
CitvoflssaquaL 851 P.2d 744 (Wash.App. 1993).
Use of the term "commercial" as a conditional use, when there is a list of
specific commercial uses allowed under each district, also results in a contradiction in the
Ordinance and fails to give meaning to more specific terms in the Ordinance. The Town
Planning Commission tried to remedy this problem, recommending that the general term
"commercial" be deleted as a conditional use in these other districts. The Town, however,
refused to make this change. (Record 388, p.64-65). Simply because the Town Council
refused to make this change, in order to have unreviewable power and discretion, does not
make it right or the Petitioners' request for review, under the statute, in bad faith.
The Town argues that the term "commercial" used in some of the districts, as
a conditional use, automatically means all of the other commercial businesses listed under
Commercial District No. 9. However, the Ordinance does not provide for such a generous
assumption, and this interpretation dramatically changes the whole Ordinance, and the extent
of any conditional use. This assumption gives the Town unlimited authority and discretion
to put any commercial business, in any district it desires.
Moreover, the application of the commercial uses listed in

General

Commercial District No. 9, to the term "commercial," used as a conditional use under the
other zoning districts does not give meaning to all of the other terms in the Ordinance, or the
more specific terms of the Ordinance. Under the conditional uses allowed in the other
16

districts there are specific commercial businesses already listed, such as "living quarters for
hired hands; seasonal laborers, or others receiving compensation for work on site; bed and
breakfast establishments; riding academies; schools and accompanying stables; dude/guest
ranch; public riding stables, child day care and nurseries." (Record 34, 35, and 37). Most
of these businesses are also listed under the General Commercial District. (Record 40). Why
specifically list these items as conditional uses, under each districts, if the intent is to apply
all of the commercial uses listed under the General Commercial District, as conditional uses
in these districts?
The more specific terms listed under each district should prevail over the more
general term, "commercial". Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 203(c) provides that
"Specific terms and exact terms are given greater weight than general language." The
general rule of contract interpretation, ejusdem generis, requires that specific terms control
over more general terms. Swenson v. Erickson. 998 P.2d 807, 812 (Utah 2000); Arizona
Biltmore Estates Ass'n v. Tezak 868 P.2d 1030 (Ariz.App. 1993). Since the businesses
allowed for a conditional use under each district are specifically listed, these specific terms
should control and the more general term "commercial" should be limited to those specific
businesses listed, and not the general provision for commercial listed under a totally different
district. Allowing such as expansive reading would render the clear and explicit limitations
listed under each district meaningless. Swenson v. Erickson. supra, at 812.
Furthermore, zoning ordinances are in derogation of the common-lawrightto
use property so as to realize its highest utility. Town of Alta v. Ben Hame Corp.. 836 P.2d
17

797 (Ut.App. 1992). Zoning laws must be given strict construction and the provisions
thereof may not be extended by implication. Id. The conditional use of contract construction
is not clearly provided for in the Ordinance under these other districts, so it should not be
allowed. Brown v. Sandv City Bd. of Adjustment 957 P.2d 207 (Ut.App. 1998).
m.

A.

THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF THE ZONING
ORDINANCE WERE VIOLATED IN GRANTING
THE CONDITIONAL USE PERMITS.
There wasn't any compliance with the Site Plan Requirements for

Conditional Uses; or with the Commercial Design Criteria for Contract Construction.
Municipal zoning authorities are bound by the terms and conditions of their own zoning
ordinances and are not at liberty to make land use decisions in derogation thereof.
Springville Citizens v. City of Springville. 979 P.2d 332 (Utah 1999), citing Thurston v.
Cache County, 626 P.2d 440 (Utah 1981).
Even if the Ordinance is found to be valid, and Town's interpretation of the
term "commercial" is accepted; the Ordinance still has numerous requirements that must be
met, before a conditional use permit can be granted, such as Site Plan Requirements for
conditional uses and Commercial Design Criteria for the business of contract construction.
These requirements were never complied with before the conditional use permits were
granted. The Town argues that a contract construction business is allowable because it is
listed under Commercial District No. 9, however, the Commercial Design Criteria, also apart
of Commercial District No. 9 was never complied with or even addressed by the Town.

18

There is no evidence that any of these conditions were met; and moreover, these
requirements were never addressed by the trial court in its findings.
Since the Town in this case did not comply with the terms and conditions of
its own zoning Ordinance, the decision granting the conditional use permits is illegal under
§10-9-1001(3)(b). Springville Citizens, supra.
IV.

THERE WASN'T ANY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
GIVEN TO THE TRIAL COURT TO SUPPORT THE
GRANTING OF THE CONDITIONAL USE PERMITS.
A municipality's decision in granting a conditional use permit is not a

legislative, but an administrative function. Therefore, a municipality's land use decision [in
granting or denying a conditional use permit] is arbitrary and capricious if it is not supported
by substantial evidence. Ralph L. Wadsworth Const.. Inc. v. West Jordan City, 999 P.2d
1240 (Ut.App. 2000); Springville Citizens, supra, citing Patterson v. Utah County Bd. Of
Adjustment 893 P.2d 602, 604 (Ut.App. 1995). In evaluating a municipality's decision
under this standard there should be sufficient evidence in the record to ensure that the
municipality proceeded within the limits of fairness and acted in good faith; and that in light
of the evidence presented, a reasonable mind could reach the same conclusion as the
municipality. The burden to provide this record is on the municipality, which is relying on
it, to make its decision. Id.
The granting of the conditional use permits, should have been treated as an
administrative/adjudicative action by the trial court. Thus, the trial court should have
determined from the record, whether or not there was sufficient evidence to support the
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Town's decision. The trial court failed to do this. Ralph L. Wads worth Const., Inc. v. West
Jordan Citv. 999 P.2d 1240 (Ut.App. 2000); Harmon City v. Draper City, 997 P.2d 321
(Ut.App. 2000).
There was no evidence presented to the trial court to support the Town's
decision to grant the conditional use permits. There certainly wasn't enough evidence
presented to the trial court, for the court to find that a reasonable person would have reached
the same decision based upon the factual evidence presented. Therefore, the land use
decision was arbitrary and capricious due to the total lack of substantial evidence.
Springville Citizens, supra.
V.

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY
CONSOLIDATING THE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
HEARING WITH A TRIAL ON THE MERITS.

A.

Petitioners was never afforded an opportunity to respond to the court's

decision to consolidate. There was no written motion to consolidate filed with the court.
The memorandum sent to Petitioner's counsel on August 27, 1999, which was a Friday, did
not arrive before the hearing. Petitioner's counsel did not have an opportunity to respond
to the court's decision to consolidate, as it was not made, until after the close of evidence and
after the final argument of counsel. Petitioner's counsel did not get adequate notice that the
court intended to consolidate the matter prior to the hearing. University of Texas v.
Comenisck 451 U.S. 390, 395, 101 S.Ct. 1830, 68 L.Ed.2d 175 (1981). See Holly Sugar
Corp. v. Goshen County Co-op Beet Growers Ass'n. 725 R2d 564 (10th Cir. 1984) (when
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preliminary injunction hearing is combined with trial on the merits, parties must be given
adequate notice of consolidation, so that they may be given full opportunity to present their
evidence): Penny. San Juan Hosp. Inc., 528 F.2d 118L 1187 (10th Cir. 1975): see also Paris
v. U.S. Dept. of Housing and Urban Development 713 F.2d 1341 (7th Cir. 1983) (parties
were prejudiced by district court's sudden consolidation of hearing on preliminary injunction
with trial on the merits, at very last minute in court). There must be clear and unambiguous
notice to the parties, of the court's intent to consolidate. U.S. v. Owens. 54 F.3d 271 (6th
Cir. 1995) cert, denied 516 U.S. 983.
In this case waiver should not apply, because adequate notice was never given
that the preliminary injunction hearing would be consolidated with a trial on the merits. In
fact, the request to consolidate wasn't even made, until the morning of the preliminary
injunction hearing. (Record 388, pp. 7 and 29).
The court abused its discretion by consolidating the matter, without any prior
notice to counsel, and after the close of evidence at the hearing. The court further
improperly presumed that it had heard of all the Petitioner's evidence that could be presented
at the time of trial. (Record 388, pp. 203-204). The court never asked counsel for the
Petitioners if there was any additional evidence that would be presented at trial. The trial
court's order consolidating the matter and dismissing the Petition should be reversed.
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VI.

THE MATTER WAS NOT BROUGHT IN BAD FAITH AND
PETITIONERS' CLAIMS ARE NOT WITHOUT MERIT.
In order to obtain attorney's fees under Utah's Bad Faith Statute, a party must

prove that the claim is both "without merit"; and that it was brought in "bad faith". Jeschke
v. Willis. 811 P.2d202 (Ut.App. 1991).
A.

The claims were not brought without merit. "Without merit" under the

statute means that the party asserting an award of fees must first demonstrate that the claim
is "frivolous" or "of little weight or importance, having no basis in law or fact." Cody v.
Johnson. 671 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1983). This has further been defined as "one in which
no justiciable question has been presented and . . . is readily recognized as devoid of merit
in that there is little prospect that it can ever succeed. Farrell v. Porter, 830 P.2d 299, 302
(Ut.App. 1992); Hunt v. Hunt 785 P.2d 414, 416 (Utah 1990). The court merely states in
its findings that, "Petitioners presented a weak factual basis and legal position." (Record
360).
The Appellees claim the matter is without merit simply because courts are to
presume that land use decisions are valid. However, as stated above this is not an absolute
presumption. If action is arbitrary, capricious or illegal, it will not be upheld. Springville
Citizens v. City of Springville. 972 P.2d 332 (Utah 1999). Furthermore, this presumption
differs

when reviewing

an

administrative

action.

The review

of an

administrative/adjudicative action focuses on whether it is supported by substantial evidence.
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Ralph L. Wadsworth Const, v. West Valley City, 999 P.2d 1240 (Ut.App. 2000); Harmon
Citv Inc., v. Draper Citv. 997 P.2d 321 (Ut.App. 2000).
In the passage of the Ordinance, justiciable questions were raised by the
Petitioners. Evidence was given that there was no official zoning map presented with the
Ordinance at a public hearing, or formally adopted by the Town. Even the trial court
concedes that there is a valid question as to whether or not such a map exists. Furthermore,
the claim that the language in the Ordinance is too vague, resulting in arbitrary enforcement,
is not without merit. Even the Planning Commission thought the Ordinance was too vague
as written, and recommended that this be changed.
There were justiciable questions raised regarding the granting of the
conditional use permits and the lack of substantial evidence. Furthermore, issues were
properly raised that the Town failed to comply with the terms of the Ordinance. The court
in its Findings found that the Petitioners failed to introduce evidence about whether or not
there was compliance with the Site Plan Requirements as contained in the zoning Ordinance.
(Record 361). This is simply not the case. The zoning Ordinance with the site plan
requirements was entered into evidence. (Record 388, p. 44-45). Petitioners testified that
they raised issues with the Site Plan Requirements; and that there had been no compliance
with the Site Plan Requirements, as contained in the Ordinance. (Record 388, p. 55).
Therefore, the Petitioners did introduce evidence of non-compliance. It was the Town who
failed to introduce evidence of compliance.
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B.

The claims were not brought in bad faith. The court did not find facts

sufficient to support any finding of bad faith. The court simply states that the "Petitioners
presented a weak factual basis and legal position." (Record 360). This is insufficient for a
finding of bad faith.
There was no factual evidence presented to the court of any unconscionable
advantage that was gained by the Petitioners in filing the Petition. Moreover, there was no
evidence presented to show how the action hindered or delayed the Respondents in any way.
Utah statute allows for injunctive relief, during the appeal of land use decision. Such relief
should not be deemed as an act of bad faith. To do so would create a chilling effect contrary
to the intent of the statute.
As far as the timing of the hearing, both Respondents were served in
accordance to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. No one requested additional time or
objected before the hearing. In fact, at the beginning of the hearing counsel for both
Respondents stated that they were prepared to proceed. The court should have allowed
additional time, if necessary, for the parties to prepare for the hearing, rather than allow the
hearing to proceed and then afterwards use this as a basis for finding bad faith.
CONCLUSION
The zoning Ordinance was not passed in accordance to Utah's enabling statutes
with a corresponding zoning map. Furthermore, the Ordinance is void and ambiguous
without a map and as written, making it subject to arbitrary and capricious enforcement. It
should be declared void and illegal.
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The Town failed to comply with the terms and conditions of its own zoning
Ordinance in granting the conditional use permits; making the action illegal. The terms of
the Ordinance should be strictly construed against the Town. Moreover, the conditional use
permits are not supported by any substantial evidence. The decision granting the conditional
use permits should be overturned. The trial court improperly consolidated the matter with
a trial on the merits without adequate notice to counsel. This decision should be reversed.
Finally, justifiable claims were made in this case, and there were no facts
presented, or adequate findings made, to support the court's ruling that the claims in this
matter were without merit and brought in bad faith. Therefore, the trial courts ruling on
attorneys fees should also be reversed.
DATED this y

day of October, 2000.
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